In a world where the pandemic makes structural problems visible, national flaws are evident. Countries in general mitigate environmental problems and try to maximize their interests. The duo internal needs and external possibilities it tests the effectiveness of foreign policy. Europe is an example.
The shock of the pandemic made it clear that the North / South fracture this time did not resist the crisis, only by pooling funds could the European dream be saved. And so it was done, the rich countries decided to contribute and the product is in sight: the guarantee of the debts was socialized. In this way, Europe managed to build a reconstruction package close to 900,000 million dollars.
Argentina should learn from that lesson. There was creative adaptation, there was intelligence to identify challenges and interests, there was greatness to change and there was realism. The ideology was dead, the interests were above. In summary, it could be said that there was a virtuous effort of the leadership to understand how the world works in pandemic. It is about shedding blinders that hide reality and looking for solutions instead of repeating old speeches.
All countries suffer from a pandemic, but the least affected are those that have the best radar that allows them to capture global geopolitics. Nothing better, then, than to start at the beginning: identify global agendas and trends. Health, economy, climate and technological revolution constitute the nucleus of the international agenda. In parallel, world power mutates, reflecting itself in a new geopolitics. These transformations are made evident by observing what happens in the three spaces where power is concentrated: Asia, the United States and Europe.
Asia, by economy and demography, is the great global protagonist and China is the center, which does not mean affirming that she is the insurmountable horizon. A detail: demographics indicate “aging in sight”, India will surpass it. From the Deng administration, in Beijing there are two concerns: the risks of the reforms, which in the USSR dragged Gorbachev, and how to preserve economic success, always exposed to external pressures that may demand the revaluation of the Yuan.
In China, reformism was scrapped, but the Communist party integrated the new business bourgeoisie. It was about capturing capital and markets by feeding the “globalizing dream”: a China supposedly converted to capitalism when it entered the WTO. That economy sucked capital, used foreign technologies and generated surpluses.
When Europe and the US realized that Chinese expansion was affecting the social and productive fabric, it was too late. Trump tried to curb it with tariffs and Chinese surpluses were channeled to emerging markets through loans and investments that enshrined Chinese governance with the connectivity of the Silk Road Initiative. That experience is almost exhausted, China stopped its loans and the silk road became the “corridor” of an unpayable debt. At the same time, internally the model changed and the emblematic businessmen are under control and some prisoners.
The Party regained centrality and is dedicated to preventing the Chinese economy from becoming globally decoupled, losing value chains, while the region encounters problems despite having recently signed a Trade Agreement (RCEP). The relationship with India is expressed in the war conflicts in the Himalayas and in the Indian, a maritime containment emerged that includes India, Japan, Australia and the United States.
In the China Sea they fear pax cynical and Taiwan is not unaware that in Hong Kong the idea of ”one country two systems” died, while ASEAN hopes to attract investments that leave China under pressure from Washington. Where Beijing is advancing is in Russia. Moscow owns a military technology stock and it is an energy powerhouse, but it is not in a position to compete in the digital economy. In that interface, Beijing and Moscow come together, the risk is Russian, to become a junior partner.
Finally, China has an unavoidable advantage: its domestic front is under total control, this includes forced labor by the Ogbures, not ratifying the ILO Convention on forced labor, or adhering to the Convention on freedom of association. Authoritarianism and “surveillance capitalism”.
In the United States, the idea of rebuilding leadership is very present in the Biden Administration. It has good and proven equipment and there is an external roadmap outlined in the think tanks tied to the Democrats. But the problem is other one. The key to all leadership implies trust and that capital was lost. No minor doubt was installed: What will happen if Trump returns in four years? 47% of the votes is a capital and observing what happened in the taking of the Capitol and the rejection of the Republican senators to impeachment, they suggest that a return is possible.
Only five Republican senators left Trump. If Biden fails to build a solid center, which includes Republicans, “foreign policy that begins at home” will not have the necessary cement of national unity. In other words: if Trump maintains his leadership, foreign policy will suffer. That is a disruptive geopolitical scenario. The balance between the internal and external agenda is difficult to achieve because in both dimensions it is necessary to accumulate power.
China will watch and revisionist powers, such as Turkey, Iran and Russia, will continue to deploy their power as they do in the Mediterranean, the Caucasus and the Middle East. The “Biden moment” is on trial. It is a management difficult to re-elect, for reasons of ageBut the speed imposed by the White House speaks of realism. The economic program does not skimp on amounts, Obama’s experience is visible, resources were lacking in the post-crisis 2008 and the Senate hindered.
In the present circumstances, the vice-presidential tiebreaker is not a minor fact. But there is a reality: the alliance of the deep America; the white supremacism; the anti-elitism of the republican base; the influence of the reformist churches; the denialism climate; the populism version S. Bannon; the fake news and the rise of conspiracy; they constitute a challenge that will require talent and ingenuity. The opposition space is culturally heir to secessionism.
Finally Europe. The sum of the pandemic, Trumpism and the Chinese threat modified the European DNA. Germany and Northern Europe agreed to share debts, approved an unprecedented reactivation program and the concept of “strategic autonomy” was installed. This objective involves being less dependent on the US, containing China and sanctioning Russian expansionism. The relationship with Biden promises to be improved, Atlanticism regained strength, but there is an unavoidable fact associated with Germany.
The German economy is overly dependent on the Chinese market, particularly the automotive industry, and in energy matters the dependence on Russian gas is notable. Under these conditions, for Berlin to apply strategic autonomy as a guiding principle is almost impossible.
Punishing Putin for persecuting opponents, demanding neutrality and non-interference, is incompatible with the Nord Stream 2 gas pipeline, which is in its final stage. Can Germany embrace strategic autonomy depending on that input? His partners have been demanding it and Washington is applying sanctions to the companies that participate in the work. In the same way, the Investment Agreement (CAI) that has just been signed between the Union and China is not explained without the pressure of the German business community.
It is decidedly easier for Europe to trade diplomacy than to assume itself as a geopolitical giant.
.
source https://pledgetimes.com/argentina-facing-the-changing-world-geopolitics/
Disqus comments